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Abstract. Managing public key certiﬁcates revocation has long been
a central issue in public key infrastructures. Though various certiﬁcate
revocation mechanisms have been proposed to address this issue, little
eﬀort has been devoted to the empirical analysis of real-world certiﬁcate
revocation data. In this paper, we conduct such an empirical analysis
based on a large amount of data collected from VeriSign. Our study en-
ables us to understand how long a revoked certiﬁcate lives and what the
diﬀerence is in the lifetime of revoked certiﬁcates by certiﬁcate types,
geographic locations, and organizations. Our study also provides a solid
foundation for future research on optimal management of certiﬁcate re-
vocation for diﬀerent types of certiﬁcates requested from diﬀerent orga-
nizations and located in diﬀerent geographic locations.
Keywords: public key infrastructure, certiﬁcate revocation, empirical
analysis.
1 Introduction
With the rapid growth of the Internet over the last decade, new challenges ap-
pear daily. Of these challenges, perhaps none is more important than the need
for protecting sensitive transactions. By means of digital certiﬁcates, public key
infrastructures provide a degree of authentication to protect sensitive transac-
tions. However, digital certiﬁcates must be revoked if the corresponding private
keys have somehow become compromised, perhaps due to attacks launched by
worms or viruses. Thus, managing certiﬁcate revocation eﬃciently has become
a major issue in public key infrastructures [14].
Previous research on certiﬁcate revocation management has primarily fo-
cused on the tradeoﬀs that can be made among diﬀerent revocation mechanisms
[6,15], including certiﬁcate revocation list (CRL) [5], certiﬁcate revocation sys-
tem (CRS) [12], certiﬁcate revocation tree (CRT) [7], and on-line certiﬁcate
status protocol (OCSP) [11]. Though various tradeoﬀs have been studied, lit-
tle eﬀort has been made toward understanding the distribution of certiﬁcate
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revocations, especially from real-world data. Understanding the distribution of
certiﬁcate revocations would enable certiﬁcate authorities to optimize their op-
erations over time.
Our Contributions. We collected ﬁve real-world certiﬁcate revocation ﬁles
from VeriSign for diﬀerent types of certiﬁcates, and conducted an in-depth em-
pirical study to understand the distribution of certiﬁcate revocations from diﬀer-
ent perspectives. This paper reports the major ﬁndings of our empirical study,
which can be summarized as follows.
– The types of certiﬁcate revocation ﬁles, which are used for diﬀerent pur-
poses, do not appear to be a fundamental factor regarding the behavior of
certiﬁcate revocation distributions. This is so because all the ﬁve individual
certiﬁcate revocation ﬁles exhibit exponential distribution patterns, so is the
merged dataset. Nevertheless, diﬀerent types of certiﬁcates can still be clus-
tered into two groups based on their mean certiﬁcate lifetimes, where each
certiﬁcate’s lifetime is deﬁned to be the diﬀerence between its revocation
date and its issue date. This may suggest that certain classes of certiﬁcate-
enabled systems (e.g., code signing and ﬁnancial applications) are better
protected than others under the assumption that other factors that aﬀect
the certiﬁcate lifetimes remain similar in the comparison.
– Although certiﬁcate revocations in diﬀerent geographic locations still exhibit
exponential distributions, the distribution parameters vary signiﬁcantly. This
implies that diﬀerent strategies should be used to disseminate certiﬁcate
revocation information for diﬀerent countries or continents. Moreover, the
average certiﬁcate lifetimes may serve as a measure for the security levels
of certiﬁcate-enabled systems in diﬀerent geographic locations provided that
no other factors that aﬀect the certiﬁcate lifetimes are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
in comparison.
– The number of revoked certiﬁcates is bouncing on a daily basis. In particu-
lar, many certiﬁcate revocations occur during weekdays, whereas few occur
during weekends. This indicates that an attacker who compromises a public
key certiﬁcate during weekends may have a better opportunity to conduct
unlawful activities before the compromised private key (i.e., the correspond-
ing certiﬁcate) is eﬀectively revoked. We also observed that the numbers of
revoked certiﬁcates in January and February in both 2005 and 2006 are al-
ways signiﬁcantly lower than their respective counterparts in other months
of the same year. This is not because the certiﬁcate-enabled systems are
better protected, but because fewer certiﬁcates are requested and issued due
to seasonal reasons.
– Diﬀerent organizations exhibit diﬀerent characteristics in terms of their cer-
tiﬁcate lifetimes. Although the certiﬁcate lifetimes still follow exponential
distributions, the average certiﬁcate lifetimes vary widely among diﬀerent
organizations, even within the same industry group such as ﬁnancial insti-
tutions. This result may stimulate organizations to improve their security
levels and security awareness in a competitive market.
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Limitations of this Paper. The nature of empirical study restricts us from
extrapolating our results to the whole universe. In particular, the following lim-
itations of the present study are identiﬁed for possible future improvements.
– The major ﬁndings of this paper are based on a number of CRL data sets col-
lected from VeriSign only. Though considered to be representative for com-
mercial use of public key certiﬁcates, VeriSign’s data may not demonstrate
the same revocation patterns as other data sets. In addition, our ﬁndings
cannot be extrapolated to OCSP responders.
– We do not have access to the certiﬁcates that are issued by VeriSign but
never revoked. While it is meaningful to investigate the ratio of revoked cer-
tiﬁcates to the certiﬁcates that are never revoked, we experience diﬃculties
in collecting such data from VeriSign or any other resources in the public do-
main (in most cases, only the information regarding the revoked certiﬁcates
is available to the public).
– We do not investigate why the certiﬁcates are revoked. Understanding var-
ious revocation reasons will deﬁnitely help us understand the relationship
between certiﬁcate revocation and the security levels of certiﬁcate-enabled
systems. For example, one can suspect that no one cares too much about
their SSL certiﬁcates if they lose the private keys, as they can get new cer-
tiﬁcates minted, maybe from someone cheaper than VeriSign. For another
example, it is very important to revoke public key certiﬁcates if someone
loses his company’s smart cards. Unfortunately, it is very diﬃcult to obtain
such information as the revocation reasons are often considered sensitive in
commercial applications (to some extent, this is similar to the situation in
which ﬁnancial organizations are disinclined to publish any security breaches
to the public).
– We do not consider many other factors in certiﬁcate revocations except the
security factor on which we focus. There could be a host of other factors
aﬀecting certiﬁcate revocations: (i) the errors made in data entries, (ii) the
purposes of the certiﬁcates being used, (iii) the reasons of the certiﬁcates
being revoked, (iv) the administration policies for certiﬁcate revocation, and
(v) the fraction of all issued certiﬁcates that get revoked. We assume that
all these factors are similar when we make connections between certiﬁcate
revocations and security levels in certiﬁcate-enabled systems.
Related Work. The work most closely related to this work is the paper “On
the Release of CRLs in Public Key Infrastructure” by Ma, Hu, and Li [9], which
builds analytical models on how often a certiﬁcate authority should release CRLs
in order to minimize its operational cost based on empirical analysis on real-world
data. However, their analysis of the data gathered from certiﬁcates is not as in
depth as what is proposed in this paper. In particular, they did not consider
the impact of geographic location and organization to the distribution of certiﬁ-
cate revocations. Another diﬀerence is that they proposed optimal CRL releasing
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strategies, while the main purpose of our study is to characterize certiﬁcate
revocations based on real empirical data.
Except [9], most of previous researches are not based on any empirical anal-
ysis of real-world data; instead, they focus on theoretical aspects of certiﬁcate
revocation including the meaning of revocation [3,4], the model of revocation [2],
communication cost of revocation [12], tradeoﬀs in certiﬁcate revocation schemes
[16], and risk management in certiﬁcate revocation [8]. Rivest has once proposed
to use short-lived certiﬁcates so as to eliminate certiﬁcate revocations [13]. How-
ever, his approach places a high burden on certiﬁcate servers which need to sign
more certiﬁcates as compared with traditional certiﬁcate revocation solutions; it
also creates the problem of key compromise which cannot be addressed without
using a separate mechanism [10].
Paper Organization. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, we discuss the methodology we used to collect and analyze real-world
data from VeriSign. In Section 3, we analyze the VeriSign data from various
perspectives including diﬀerences in certiﬁcate revocation between certiﬁcate
classes, geographic factors in certiﬁcate revocation, trends in certiﬁcate revoca-
tion rates over time, and trends in certiﬁcate revocation rates by organizations.
We also discuss how to derive optimal certiﬁcate revocation policies based on
our empirical results. Finally, in Section 4, we summarize our research and point
out possible future directions.
2 Methodology and Data Collection
To investigate certiﬁcate revocation, we used VeriSign’s Certiﬁcate Revocation
Lists (CRLs) to ﬁnd certiﬁcates that have been revoked over the last several
years. After gathering a large sample of revoked certiﬁcates, VeriSign’s database
was queried using its web interface to determine relevant information about each
certiﬁcate such as when the certiﬁcate was issued, what organization requested
the certiﬁcate, and its country of origin. However, not all of their certiﬁcate data
is publicly accessible. Though VeriSign allows users to determine the status of
some certiﬁcates through a web interface, we could not ﬁnd information about
certiﬁcates from all CRL ﬁles through it. Because of this, our analysis is limited
to the data we could gather from the ﬁles mentioned later.
We also encountered similar problems when considering analyzing data from
other certiﬁcate authorities such as Thawte and GeoTrust. Since the CRL ﬁle
contains the revoked date for each certiﬁcate, we would require some way to deter-
mine the date a certiﬁcate was issued to determine its lifetime. Though both cer-
tiﬁcate authorities do publish CRLs, neither of them oﬀers an interface to search
their certiﬁcate database, making any analysis of their CRL ﬁles impossible.
We were also interested in discovering the number of active certiﬁcates (in-
cluding those never revoked) so that it would be possible to compare the num-
ber of revoked certiﬁcates to the number of active certiﬁcates at a given time.
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Unfortunately, aside from searching the Internet to ﬁnd live VeriSign certiﬁcates,
there is no easy way to determine this. Though VeriSign’s web interface does
allow users to search its database by organization name which does return some
valid certiﬁcates, organizations can also request that their certiﬁcates not be
viewable through that interface. Because of this, even if we had attempted to
build a list of valid certiﬁcates, there would be no guarantees of its completeness.
Using the CRLs available, we were able to analyze the data gathered to char-
acterize certiﬁcate lifetimes by diﬀerent sub-ﬁelds. In this paper, we will try to
characterize the lifetime of revoked certiﬁcates by the following criteria:
– The lifetime of certiﬁcates over time
– The diﬀerence in the lifetime of certiﬁcates by type
– The diﬀerence in the lifetime of certiﬁcates by geographic location
– The characteristics of certiﬁcate lifetimes by organization
Table 1. Breakdown of the Composite Data Set by CRL File
File
Name
Issue Date # Cer-
tiﬁcates
Dates Cov-
ered
Purpose
SVRIntl 3/26/2007 21192 2/15/2005-
3/26/2007
Global Server certiﬁcates
RSA 3/13/2007 10100 12/18/2004-
3/13/2007
Secure Server certiﬁcates; also a root
CA
Secure 3/26/2007 11898 12/18/2004-
3/26/2007
Secure Server certiﬁcates
Financial 3/26/2007 326 5/7/2002-
3/26/2007
OFX certiﬁcates
Code
signing
3/13/2007 1413 9/28/2004-
3/13/2007
Code signing and object signing
certiﬁcates for use with Netscape
browsers, Microsoft Internet Ex-
plorer browsers, Microsoft Oﬃce,
Sun Java Signing, Macromedia, and
Marimba
For the purpose of this paper, ﬁve CRL ﬁles were used to ﬁnd revoked certiﬁ-
cates which were used to create our data pool. The ﬁles chosen for this research
are described in Table 1. Since VeriSign removes most certiﬁcates from its CRLs
after they expire [1] (most certiﬁcates have a one to two years issued lifespan
before their expiration), most of the certiﬁcates contained in the lists cover the
past two years. Between these ﬁve CRL ﬁles, 44,929 certiﬁcates were gathered.
Since each CRL ﬁle only includes the serial number and revocation date for each
certiﬁcate, a Ruby script was used to search VeriSign’s database for each cer-
tiﬁcate’s issue date, country of origin, and the organization that requested the
certiﬁcate.
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3 Empirical Analysis
First, we would like to examine the trend of certiﬁcate lifetimes for revoked
certiﬁcates from all of the CRL ﬁles. The lifetime of a certiﬁcate can be deﬁned
as follows:
Actual Lifetime = Date Revoked − Date Issued
Fig. 1. Number of Certiﬁcates Revoked vs.
Certiﬁcate Lifetime
Fig. 2. Number of Certiﬁcates Revoked
vs. Percentage of Lifetime Achieved
We begin our analysis by plotting the lifetime of a certiﬁcate against the
amount of certiﬁcates revoked for that lifetime. As can be seen in Figure 1, the
lifetime of a revoked certiﬁcate is fairly short. In fact, the average lifetime for
certiﬁcates in the composite data set is 28 days. However, this plot does not
take into account the fact that certiﬁcates expire at diﬀerent rates. While some
certiﬁcates may only be valid for a year, the issued lifetime of other certiﬁcates
may be two or three years. The issued lifetime of a certiﬁcate can be calculated
as:
Issued Lifetime = Expiration Date − Date Issued
To see what kind of diﬀerence this might have, in Figure 2 we take this into
account by plotting the percent of a certiﬁcate’s normal lifetime against the
number of certiﬁcates that were revoked after that percentage. As can be seen,
the trends displayed in Figure 1 still hold. We discovered that the mean percent
lifetime of any given certiﬁcate is 4.8%.
By using the dfittool and expfit functions of Matlab, it was determined
that this data follows an exponential distribution. The common form of the
probability density function (PDF) for the exponential distribution is as follows:
R(t) = ke−kt
However, Matlab uses an alternate form of the exponential distribution. This
form is:
f(x) =
1
μ
e−
x
µ
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The composite data set was discovered to follow the exponential distribution
with the parameter μ being 27.56 at a 95% conﬁdence interval. When testing
the percent lifetime view, it was also determined to follow the exponential dis-
tribution with μ = 0.0479 at a 95% conﬁdence interval. This is an interesting
ﬁnding: most revoked certiﬁcates have lifetimes shorter than a month, or 4% of
their issued lifetimes, even though they have one to two years issued lifetimes.
As it is mentioned earlier, our research is restricted to the certiﬁcates that get
revoked.
3.1 Diﬀerences between Certiﬁcate Classes
Now that we have examined the characteristics of the data set as a whole, we
were also interested in breaking down the data into the individual ﬁles and seeing
how well the distribution holds. Table 2 shows the mean lifetime for the revoked
certiﬁcates from each CRL ﬁle. While the International, RSA, and Secure server
certiﬁcates have relatively similar mean lifetimes, the mean lifetime for Code
Signing and Financial certiﬁcates is nine to ten days (or about 25%) longer than
the others.
Table 2. Mean Certiﬁcate Actual Lifetime by CRL File
CRL File μ (mean)
International 26.83
RSA 27.12
Secure 27.99
Code Signing 35.72
Financial 37.08
Figure 3 plots each of the ﬁve CRL ﬁles separately to see how well the distri-
bution holds. Though there is some diﬀerence in scale, the data from each ﬁle
still follows the exponential distribution with the parameter μ shown in Table
2, all at a 95% conﬁdence interval.
This result indicates that the type of certiﬁcates is not a fundamental factor
regarding the distribution of certiﬁcate revocations. An exponential distribution
is observed for each of the ﬁve certiﬁcate revocation ﬁles and for the merged
dataset. The diﬀerence in the mean value of certiﬁcate lifetimes may suggest
that certain classes of certiﬁcate-enabled systems (e.g., code signing and ﬁnan-
cial) are better protected than others under the assumption that all other factors
aﬀecting certiﬁcate lifetimes are similar in comparison. It should be noted that
the protection levels are not the only factor aﬀecting the certiﬁcate lifetimes. For
instance, the diﬀerences in certiﬁcate lifetimes in diﬀerent certiﬁcate-enabled sys-
tems could suggest that the administrators of certain systems such as ﬁnancial
servers (for which certiﬁcates get revoked slowly) work in environments in which
it takes longer to get authorization for revocation. On the other hand, some cer-
tiﬁcates get revoked quickly because errors were made in data entries, or because
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Fig. 3. Certiﬁcate Actual Lifetime by CRL File
the certiﬁcates were for tests or experimental systems. To get a comprehensive
understanding about protection levels, one needs to know about all these factors
that aﬀect certiﬁcate lifetimes, which may include the purposes of the certiﬁcates
being used, the reasons of the certiﬁcates being revoked, the administration poli-
cies for certiﬁcate revocation, and the fraction of all issued certiﬁcates that get
revoked. The certiﬁcate lifetime in a certiﬁcate-enabled system can be consid-
ered as a multivariate function of many variables; in our discussions, we focus
on the variable of protection levels while assuming that the other variables are
ﬁxed. A more comprehensive study on all such variables is an obvious topic for
future work if suﬃcient data is available.
3.2 Geographic Factors
Now that a standard has been created to compare against, we would ﬁrst like
to discover if geographic location has any inﬂuence on the lifetime of a revoked
digital certiﬁcate. In all, 136 countries were identiﬁed in the CRL ﬁles we used.
To begin, we ﬁrst investigated CRL usage of the country with the most total
certiﬁcates revoked, the United States, and plotted the results in Figure 4.
Considering that certiﬁcates from the United States make up a large portion of
the composite data, it is not surprising that Figure 4 is very similar to Figure 1.
Before coming to any conclusions, we then plotted the results for four of the other
leading certiﬁcate holders in Figure 5. The diﬀerence in the amount of certiﬁcates
used by these countries is signiﬁcantly smaller than that of the United States,
so a smaller scale will be used to display these graphs.
We also examined the behavior of certiﬁcate lifetimes over the ﬁrst 30 days
more clearly, Figure 6 shows the same data from Figure 5 on an even smaller
scale (i.e., Figure 6 is a “zoom in” of a portion of Figure 5).
Like the composite data set, when divided by country these data sets also
follow the exponential distribution. Table 3 gives the parameter μ for each of
the data sets (all at a 95% conﬁdence interval). Interestingly enough, the trends
shown in the initial results hold true when the data is broken down by geographic
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Fig. 4. Number of Certiﬁcates Revoked
vs. Lifetime (United States)
Fig. 5. Number of Certiﬁcates Revoked
vs. Lifetime (Remaining Countries)
Fig. 6. Number of Certiﬁcates Revoked vs. Lifetime (Remaining Countries - magniﬁed)
region. In all cases, a large number of certiﬁcates are revoked within the ﬁrst
month before falling oﬀ to a few revocations per day after that. By these results,
it can be inferred that location plays only a minor role in certiﬁcate revocation
rates. However, it is also of interest to note that the average lifetime of a revoked
certiﬁcate in Japan is less than half that of any of the other countries shown here.
Since the average certiﬁcate lifetimes vary signiﬁcantly for diﬀerent geographic
locations, diﬀerent strategies may be used to disseminate certiﬁcate revocation
information for diﬀerent countries or continents. Moreover, the average certiﬁ-
cate lifetimes may serve as a metric for the security levels of certiﬁcate-enabled
systems in diﬀerent geographic locations provided that all other factors that
aﬀect the certiﬁcate revocation are the same.
3.3 Trends in Revocation Rates over Time
Another view of the data we were interested in was tracking certiﬁcate revoca-
tion rates over time. If surges in revoked certiﬁcates could be found, we would
expect that these surges could be traced back to the occurrence of major security
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Table 3. Mean Certiﬁcate Lifetime by Country (in days)
US JP GB CA AU DE
29.48 13.15 25.18 37.26 30.62 29.36
Fig. 7. Certiﬁcates Revoked Per Day
(2006)
Fig. 8. Certiﬁcates Revoked Per Day
(2005)
incidents such as widespread worms or viruses. Figure 7 displays the amount
of certiﬁcates revoked per day from the composite data during the period of
1/1/2006 to 12/31/2006.
Though we did observe small peaks in the amount of certiﬁcates revoked per
day, there were no extraordinarily large spikes in certiﬁcate revocations like we
thought there might possibly be. What we did notice was the wave-like bouncing
pattern that certiﬁcate revocations follow. Upon further investigation, we found
that nearly all certiﬁcation revocations happened between Monday and Friday,
with only minimal revocations occurring on weekends. To make sure that this
trend did not only occur in 2006, we also investigated the data from 2005 in
Figure 8 and compared the trends between 2006 and 2005 in Figure 9.
Fig. 9. Number of Certiﬁcates Revoked Per Day (2006 compared to 2005)
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Surely enough, the pattern still holds. From these two ﬁgures, we observed
that the number of certiﬁcates revoked per day in January and February is
signiﬁcantly smaller than the number of certiﬁcates revoked per day in other
months. Another observation is that the number of certiﬁcates revoked per day
increases signiﬁcantly from 2005 to 2006. These changes are primarily due to
the changes in the total number of certiﬁcates being issued at diﬀerent times.
To make this clear, we also investigated the percentage of the valid certiﬁcates
revoked each day. Since we did not have access to VeriSign’s database to deter-
mine the true number of certiﬁcates active at a given time, we instead used the
certiﬁcates from the CRL ﬁles to determine the number of not-yet-revoked cer-
tiﬁcates daily. Figure 10 below plots the percentage of certiﬁcates revoked daily
(over the total number of certiﬁcates that have not been revoked at the begin-
ning of the day, which would vary on a daily basis) for the period of 1/3/2005
through 3/26/2007.
Fig. 10. Percentage of Certiﬁcates Revoked Daily
Because every certiﬁcate in a CRL ﬁle is eventually revoked, the end of the
curve in Figure 10 is skewed because at the end of the time period, 100% of the
certiﬁcates are revoked. However, this is artiﬁcial and does not aﬀect the data
before it. On average, 4% of the total revoked certiﬁcates were revoked daily.
From this plot it can be seen that no matter how many total revoked certiﬁcates
are in existence, the percentage of certiﬁcates revoked daily stays fairly constant
with some small growth over time. Next, we were interested in seeing how the
number of not-yet-revoked certiﬁcates plots over time. In Figure 11, we plot the
number of not-yet-revoked certiﬁcates over the same period of time.
Since these CRL ﬁles contain only certiﬁcates that were eventually revoked,
the number of certiﬁcates active at the end becomes zero. Other than the rise
and decline at the starting and ending periods, there is only one sharp change
in active certiﬁcates, as the number of active certiﬁcates double in number in
March, due to expired certiﬁcates being removed from the CRLs. Even with this
large increase of active certiﬁcates, the percent of certiﬁcates revoked daily only
gradually rises. This implies that the number of revoked certiﬁcates changes in
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Fig. 11. Number of Not-Yet-Revoked
Certiﬁcates over Time
Fig. 12. # Not-Yet-Revoked Certiﬁcates
Compared to # Revoked Certiﬁcates
Fig. 13. Number of Certiﬁcates Revoked Per Day - Breakdown by Length of Lifetime
a similar trend as the number of active certiﬁcates does and this similarity in
trend is illustrated in Figure 12 on a daily basis.
In Figure 13, we take a diﬀerent approach to viewing the actual lifetime of
revoked certiﬁcates. In this chart, we take the number of certiﬁcates revoked
over a two week period and break down the certiﬁcates revoked each day by the
lifetime of certiﬁcate before it was revoked. We observed that almost one third
of certiﬁcates were revoked within one day after they were issued, and that only
about one third of certiﬁcates enjoyed lifetime greater than 10 days. Since we
do not have access to the reasons why these certiﬁcates are revoked, we cannot
further interpret this result.
3.4 Trends by Organization
From the ﬁles collected, 15,341 organizations were identiﬁed. However, due to
diﬀerences in how the company name was placed on the certiﬁcate, it is likely
that there are fewer than that amount. To make our data as correct as possible,
records that had similar names but only diﬀered by punctuation (ex. Verisign Inc.
and Verisign, Inc.) were modiﬁed and merged into one standard name. We began
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Fig. 14. Number of Certiﬁcates Revoked by Organization (Top 30)
our analysis by visualizing the amount of certiﬁcates used by each organization.
Since it would be impossible to list the number of certiﬁcates revoked for every
company, we decided to instead focus on a smaller portion of the organizations.
Figure 14 shows the top 30 organizations by certiﬁcates revoked.
Another one of the ways we would have liked to examine the data is from a
per certiﬁcate perspective, judging the distance between when a given certiﬁcate
is revoked and when the next certiﬁcate for the organization is issued. Since
each company uses multiple certiﬁcates at any given time, it is impossible to
determine the average time between when a certiﬁcate is revoked and when
its replacement is issued. Instead, we will have to use other methods to try to
measure the security of an organization. First, we determine the mean certiﬁcate
lifetime for each company in Table 4.
For these top ﬁve companies, the means vary widely. It is interesting to note
that the mean lifetime for certiﬁcates issued to Bank of America and Citigroup,
both ﬁnancial institutions, diﬀer by almost 45 days. While this may not for
certain say that one company is more secure than the other, it does show that
these organizations have either mishandled their certiﬁcates or possibly have had
breaches in their security.
Since these numbers vary so widely, we next decided to ﬁt the lifetime data
for each of the above organizations to a probability distribution. We determined
that when the data is divided by organization, it still follows the exponential
distribution, as shown in Figure 15. The parameter μ for each organization is
given by the mean listed in Table 4, all at a 95% conﬁdence interval.
Clearly, diﬀerent organizations exhibit diﬀerent characterizations in terms of
their certiﬁcate lifetimes. While the certiﬁcate lifetimes still follow exponential
distributions, the average certiﬁcate lifetimes change from organization to orga-
nization, even within the same industry group such as ﬁnancial institutions. If
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Table 4. Mean Certiﬁcate Lifetime by Organization
Organization Mean Certiﬁcate Lifetime (in days)
Bank of America Corporation 15.92
Citigroup 60.32
Ford Motor Company 42.28
JPMorgan Chase 50.00
Hewlett-Packard 14.34
Fig. 15. Number of Certiﬁcates Revoked vs. Lifetime (By Top 5 Organizations with
Revoked Certiﬁcates)
the average certiﬁcate lifetimes are treated as a reﬂection of the organizations’
security level or security awareness, those organizations in a competitive market
should investigate why their certiﬁcates are revoked more or less frequently than
their competitors and how to improve their certiﬁcate lifetimes at organizational
levels. It is imaginable that the publication of more empirical analysis on certiﬁ-
cate lifetimes would stimulate organizations to increase their security levels or
security awareness, especially in a competitive market.
3.5 Discussion on Optimal Management of Certiﬁcate Revocation
Our empirical analysis provides a solid foundation for optimal management of
certiﬁcate revocation for diﬀerent types of certiﬁcates requested from diﬀerent
organizations located in diﬀerent geographic locations. The reason is that our
study enables us to understand the distribution of certiﬁcates being newly re-
voked and the distribution of certiﬁcates being cumulatively revoked both on a
daily basis. Given these distributions, a certiﬁcate authority (CA) can minimize
its operational cost for any type of certiﬁcates based on the analytical models
proposed in [9], where the CA’s operation cost consists of three parts: (i) the
expected liability cost per certiﬁcate revocation if CA delays publishing the re-
vocation for one day; (ii) the ﬁxed cost for CA to publish a CRL regardless of its
size; and (iii) the variable cost for CA to include each individual certiﬁcate into
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a CRL. The CA needs to balance between the liability cost of not releasing CRL
on time and the ﬁxed and variable costs of releasing CRL too often for optimal
management of certiﬁcate revocation.
We should note that the distribution of certiﬁcates being newly revoked and
the distribution of certiﬁcates being cumulatively revoked are not derived di-
rectly from empirical data in [9]; instead, they are deduced from the exponen-
tial distribution of certiﬁcate lifetimes. Consequently, these distributions become
constant after the time reaches the issued lifetime. However, as it is shown in
our paper, these distributions may ﬂuctuate over time in reality. The analyt-
ical models proposed in [9] therefore need to be revised so as to capture this
phenomenon.
4 Conclusion and Future Work
The certiﬁcate revocation is a very complicated issue and is aﬀected by many
factors. This paper analyzes the inﬂuence of these factors empirically from the
Verisign’s data. Our research represents the ﬁrst step towards linking empirical
observations to mathematical models in description of the complicated problem
of certiﬁcate revocation. We have focused on the empirical part in this study.
In the future, we plan to conduct extended research on optimal management of
certiﬁcate revocation based on our empirical analysis. We also hope to conduct
a more thorough examination of the per organization data from a larger and
more continuous data pool.
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